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AT HOME IN THE OUTER LIMITS:
DAIMLERCHRYSLER V. BAUMAN
AND THE BOUNDS OF GENERAL
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
TODD W. NOELLE

∗

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction is
1
often characterized as confusing : awash with conflicting justifications,
2
3
labyrinthine plurality opinions, and plain incoherence. But, amidst
this sea of uncertainty, the Supreme Court’s rulings in one area of
personal jurisdiction doctrine, that of general personal jurisdiction,
have been remarkably consistent. Put simply, a tribunal has general
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is “essentially at home” in
4
the forum state. This doctrinal brevity in general personal
jurisdiction, however, belies the difficulties facing lower federal courts
in trying to decide what “essentially at home” means.
The tangled webs of corporate and commercial relationships
typifying modern international commerce exacerbate the difficulty of
5
the “essentially at home” inquiry. In DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, the
Court will address these difficulties by answering two questions. First,
can a multinational corporation that does millions of dollars worth of
business in a forum state by means of a wholly owned subsidiary be
properly “at home” in that state? And if so, does this exercise of
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1. See Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The
Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 869 (2012)
(recognizing that the Supreme Court has not provided a complete and clear legal and political
theory regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
2. E.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
3. A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 617, 618 (2006).
4. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
5. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. argued Oct. 15, 2013).
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jurisdiction accord with the “traditional notions of fair play and
6
substantial justice” required by the Fourteenth Amendment? The
Court’s resolution of these questions will have profound implications
for any corporation seeking to do business in the United States.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During Argentina’s so-called “Dirty War” from 1976 to 1983,
7
German car manufacturer DaimlerChrysler AG’s (DaimlerChrysler)
predecessor in interest owned a subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina,
8
which operated a plant in Gonzales-Catan, Argentina. Plaintiffs,
former employees and relatives of employees at the plant, allege that
Mercedes-Benz Argentina collaborated with Argentina’s ruling
military junta to commit human rights violations against them and
9
their family members.
According to Plaintiffs, Mercedes-Benz Argentina labeled certain
workers as “subversives” and “agitators” and passed those workers’
10
names to state security forces. Those security forces kidnaped,
11
punished, tortured, and killed the labeled workers. Further,
Mercedes-Benz Argentina allowed Argentine military and state
police forces inside the plant for periodic raids. Mercedes-Benz
Argentina also hired an officer of the state police—who had
organized many of the raids within the Gonzales-Catan plant—as a
security chief and paid for his representation in later Argentinian
12
lawsuits concerning these events.
In 2004, twenty-two of these plaintiffs sued DaimlerChrysler,
among other defendants, in the Northern District of California under
the Alien Torts Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act for the
alleged human rights violations arising from Mercedes-Benz
13
Argentina’s collaboration with the military junta.

6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
7. Though the named defendant below and petitioner before the Supreme Court is
“DaimlerChrysler AG” (AG stands for “Aktiengesellschaft,” a designation for a German public
stock company), it has since changed its name to “Daimler AG.” Brief for Petitioner at ii,
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. June 27, 2013), 2013 WL 3362080.
8. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub
nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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DaimlerChrysler is a German stock company headquartered in
14
Stuttgart, Germany. Following a merger in 1998, the American
Chrysler Corporation became one of DaimlerChrysler’s wholly
15
owned subsidiaries. At the time of litigation, DaimlerChrysler had
no offices or persistent operations in California. DaimlerChrysler’s
activities and contacts in California consisted of maintaining counsel
in San Francisco and initiating lawsuits in California to challenge that
16
state’s clean air laws and to protect other various business interests.
However, DaimlerChrysler manufactured product designs specifically
17
for the California market, was listed on the Pacific Stock exchange in
18
San Francisco, and was a corporate partner with the California19
based Global Nature Fund.
Rather than manufacture, market, and sell cars in California
directly, DaimlerChrysler conducted its business operations in
California, and the United States generally, through a series of
corporate subsidiaries and holding companies. To wit,
DaimlerChrysler wholly owned the DaimlerChrysler North American
Holding Company, which in turn wholly owned Mercedes-Benz USA
20
LLC. Mercedes-Benz USA purchased luxury cars manufactured by
21
DaimlerChrysler and sold them in the United States. Unlike its
parent, Mercedes-Benz USA had extensive, permanent contacts in
California, including a regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle
22
Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irving.
14. Id. at 913.
15. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005).
16. DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 917.
17. DaimlerChrysler, 2005 WL 3157472, at *7–8.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *8.
20. DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 913.
21. Id. The relationship between DaimlerChrysler and Mercedes-Benz USA is laid out in
a “General Distributor Agreement.” Id. at 914–17. In short, the agreement states that
Mercedes-Benz USA and DaimlerChrysler are to agree each year on sales figures and goals. It
further allows DaimlerChrysler to oversee Mercedes-Benz USA’s network of resellers, many of
its systems such as accounting and control, and dealership standards. The agreement also
requires Mercedes-Benz USA to abide by DaimlerChrysler guidelines concerning management
personnel, vehicle servicing by authorized dealers, warranty terms, and vehicle alteration.
Further, Mercedes-Benz USA is required to “actively market” Mercedes-Benz vehicles, display
signs, maintain an “acceptable” level of working capital, and abide by a number of other
strictures. Id.
22. Id. at 914. The parties both seemed to concede that Mercedes-Benz USA’s contacts
with California would be sufficient to subject Mercedes-Benz USA to general jurisdiction there;
however, at oral argument, the Supreme Court was skeptical as to the sufficiency of the contacts
and DaimlerChrysler denied it had conceded that issue below. Transcript of Oral Argument at
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The district court held that DaimlerChrysler’s direct contacts with
California were insufficient to allow jurisdiction, but inquired whether
Mercedes-Benz USA’s contacts could be imputed or attributed to
DaimlerChrysler, its corporate parent.
In the Ninth Circuit, a subsidiary corporation’s contacts can be
attributed to a parent when the subsidiary corporation functions as
23
the parent corporation’s agent. To make this determination the
district court asks whether the “subsidiary represents the parent
corporation by performing services ‘sufficiently important to the
[parent] corporation that if it did not have a representative to
perform them, the [parent] corporation . . . would undertake to
24
25
perform similar services.’” The court found no such representation.
The district court held that California could not exercise general
26
jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The questions on appeal
were (1) what factual showing was needed to satisfy the agency test,
and (2) whether the district court had applied this jurisdictional
agency test correctly. The Ninth Circuit found that DaimlerChrysler’s
agency relationship with an “at home” United States subsidiary
subjected it to general jurisdiction in California.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction emanates from the Due
27
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that
“[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
28
without due process of law.” California’s long-arm statute allows
California courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over all defendants

6, DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. argued Oct. 15, 2013).
23. DaimlerChrysler, 2005 WL 3157472, at *11.
24. Id. (quoting Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d
1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at *19. Despite the finding of insufficient contacts, the district court inquired as to
the reasonableness of California exercising jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler by analyzing
seven factors and determined exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id.
27. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (“Since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned . . . on
the ground that proceedings in a court of justice . . . over [parties] whom that court has no
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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to the extent permitted by the constitutions of California and the
29
United States.
The modern regime of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence begins
with the canonical “minimum contacts” analysis from International
30
Shoe v. Washington, but has since bifurcated into two related yet
distinct lines of inquiry: specific and general jurisdiction. When a nonresident defendant carries on certain activities within the forum state,
and is sued under a cause of action relating to that activity, the forum
31
state tribunal has specific personal jurisdiction over that defendant.
Under this doctrine, even “single or occasional acts” may be sufficient
to render an otherwise out-of-state corporation “answerable in that
State with respect to those acts, though not with respect to matters
32
unrelated to the forum connections.”
Beyond specific jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant’s activities
in the forum state may be so “continuous and systematic” as to
33
subject that defendant to general personal jurisdiction. Tribunals in a
forum state having general jurisdiction over a defendant can hear
34
“any and all claims against [that defendant],” whether arising from
35
activity in the forum state or not. For an individual defendant, the
“paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
36
individual’s domicile.” In 2012, the Supreme Court noted a
defendant-corporation’s equivalent forum would be “one in which the
37
corporation is fairly regarded as at home” —often the state of
38
incorporation and/or principal place of business.

29. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2013).
30. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
31. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011)
(noting specific jurisdiction obtains when a corporation’s “in-state activity is ‘continuous and
systematic’ and that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)
(“[D]ue process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.”).
34. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
35. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 15.
36. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853.
37. Id. at 2853–54 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988)).
38. Id. at 2854.
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Though the determination of where a party is “essentially at
home” for general jurisdiction purposes seems primarily based on
that party’s formal, legal relationships with the forum—such as
“domicile” or “incorporation”—any analysis into personal jurisdiction
39
must additionally consider contacts with the forum state.
Presumably, a party that maintains its domicile in or incorporates
within a forum state is deemed per se to have sufficient contacts for
personal jurisdiction.
Even if a defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state,
any exercise of jurisdiction must accord with the “traditional notions
40
of fair play and substantial justice.” Put another way, exercise of
jurisdiction must be “reasonable.” In practice, reasonability is
determined on a case-by-case basis by the evaluation of several
41
factors : (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s
interests; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4) the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining efficient resolutions;
(5) and the interest of the several states in furthering certain social
42
policies.
At first glance, general personal jurisdiction seems
uncomplicated—defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in their
home states. The complex nature of corporate relationships, however,
has made determining the states in which a corporation finds itself at
home challenging. Can a corporate defendant ever be subject to
general jurisdiction in a foreign state? The Supreme Court holds yes,
but only in extremely rare, if not extraordinary, circumstances.
1. Continuous and Systematic Contacts: The Perkins Threshold
A tribunal has general adjudicative jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when that defendant performs activities so
“‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially
43
at home in the forum state.” The Court has provided very little
guidance to define exactly what continuous and systematic means in

39. See Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires . . .
[that the defendant] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
40. Id.
41. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
42. Id.
43. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
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44

practice.
45
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company is the
“textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a
46
foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.” In
Perkins, the president of a Philippine mining company effectively
managed the company from his home in Ohio throughout the
47
Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II. The
president kept files, managed company correspondence, issued
salaries, maintained bank accounts, held directors meetings, and
supervised the company’s wartime activities, all from his home in
48
Ohio. After the war, the company was sued in Ohio for various
49
claims arising out of its Philippine operations. The Perkins Court
framed the jurisdiction issue as a question of “general fairness to the
corporation,” placing the company’s activities in the wider context of
due process: “Whether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
50
clause to insure.”
Noting the “continuous and systematic supervision” of the
company’s wartime interests taking place in Ohio, the Court found it
was fair for Ohio to exercise personal jurisdiction over the company.
It appears the Perkins Court took for granted that general
adjudicative jurisdiction could be proper in fora where a defendant
has no formal ties such as incorporation or residency. Yet Perkins
indicates that, absent such formal ties, the quality and nature of a nonresident’s forum state activities must be of particular depth and
ubiquity.

44. Id. at 2854 (“In only two decisions postdating International Shoe . . . has this Court
considered whether an out-of-state corporate defendant's in-state contacts were sufficiently
‘continuous and systematic’ to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated
to those contacts.”).
45. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
46. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d
1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
47. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 438–39.
50. Id. at 447.
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2. Insufficient Contacts: Regular Business Dealings and “Stream
of Commerce”
Regular and purposeful commercial activity within a forum state
does not satisfy the Perkins “continuous and systematic” threshold.
Three decades after Perkins, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,
51
S.A. v. Hall, the Court refused to find that a Colombian helicopter
company was subject to general jurisdiction in Texas based on its
52
regular purchase of machines and parts from a Fort Worth company.
The Court stated that the Colombian company’s purchases and other
intermittent relations with Texas did not “constitute the kind of
continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found
53
to exist in Perkins.”
54
Similarly, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
the Court rejected exercise of general personal jurisdiction over three
of Goodyear USA’s foreign subsidiaries when some of those
subsidiaries’ tires entered the “stream of commerce” in North
55
Carolina. Although the unanimous Court noted the flow of a
manufacturer’s goods in the stream of commerce “may bolster an
affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction,” it found the stream-ofcommerce showing insufficient to allow exercise of general
56
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
Goodyear, decided after the Ninth Circuit disposed of
DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, is notable for several other reasons. First,
it expanded the language in Perkins and Helicopteros, rephrasing the
51. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
52. Id. at 418–19. The Court relied as well on Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Curtis Brown
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), for the proposition that purchases and related trips to the forum state
were insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 417.
53. Id. at 416.
54. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
55. Id.at 2855–58. The “stream of commerce” concept in personal jurisdiction represents
one of the more contentious areas of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, though it is generally
limited to specific personal jurisdiction and products liability cases. The notion is that if one
places a good in the stream of commerce with the reasonable expectation or hope that it will
reach the forum state, that party can be considered to have purposefully availed itself of the
laws of that state, rendering it amenable to suit there. It has rarely, if ever, been invoked for a
claim of general personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 121 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reasoning that jurisdiction was proper over a
foreign supplier of component parts to a foreign bicycle manufacturer selling products in the
forum state because that supplier would benefit from sales in that state); World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 313–17 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the fact
defendants purposefully put an automobile into the stream of commerce where it could
reasonably be expected to go to Oklahoma could be sufficient to allow suit against it there).
56. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855–56.
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sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts for general jurisdiction as
“affiliations . . . so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the
57
defendant] essentially at home in the forum state.” Second, the
plaintiffs in Goodyear claimed that Goodyear USA and all of its
58
subsidiaries were a “single enterprise,” thus allowing the attribution
of Goodyear USA’s contacts with the forum state to all of its other
59
owned subsidiaries. Though the Goodyear Court rejected this theory
as not preserved, it opined without elaboration that such a theory
would require the Court to “pierce Goodyear corporate veils, at least
60
for jurisdictional purposes.”
Simply put, “piercing the corporate veil” means ignoring the
formal relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiaries
61
that shields one from liability for the other’s activities. Thus, in a
jurisdictional sense, a “single enterprise theory” can pierce the
corporate veil by holding the parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary
subject to suit in the forum state based on the subsidiary’s
relationship with that state, and vice versa. The Court was thus quite
dismissive of a contemplated attribution of jurisdictional contacts,
62
very much akin to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in DaimlerChrysler.
None of these cases expressly limit a forum’s exercise of general
jurisdiction over a corporation solely to the states where it is
incorporated or where it maintains its principal place of business. The
contacts analysis required by International Shoe still obtains. The
benchmark set by Perkins for satisfying the contacts requirement,
however, is extraordinarily high.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Helicopteros, suggested that the
Due Process Clause might allow a state to exercise general
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who did not maintain
“continuous and systematic” contacts with that state: “Nothing in
Perkins suggests, however, that such ‘continuous and systematic’
contacts are a necessary minimum before a state may constitutionally
63
assert general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.” Beyond
57. Id. at 2851 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 2857.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1264 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “piercing the corporate
veil” as “[t]he judicial act of imposing personal liability on otherwise immune corporate officers,
directors, or shareholders for the corporations wrongful acts”).
62. See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
63. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 421 (1984) (Brennan,
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vague allusions to purposeful availment, however, Justice Brennan did
not discuss what circumstances would be required to allow a forum
state to exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in
64
the absence of Perkins-level contacts.
B. General Jurisdiction Analysis and the Circuit Courts
Guiding Supreme Court precedent allows for few and limited
circumstances when general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
is proper. And in its modern jurisdiction jurisprudence, the Court has
never suggested that imputation or attribution of a subsidiary’s
contacts to a parent corporation is proper. Indeed, only a single
Supreme Court case decided nine decades ago, Cannon
65
Manufacturing Company v. Cudahy Packing Company, discussed
infra, even tangentially addresses whether a corporation can be
subject to general jurisdiction based on its subsidiary’s contacts.
Nevertheless, lower federal courts have filled this lack of guiding
precedent with several tests for finding when a subsidiary’s activity or
presence (i.e. contacts) in the forum state renders the parent
“essentially at home” there.
The circuit courts employ either or both of two tests to decide
when a subsidiary’s contacts in the forum state can be imputed to the
parent corporation, thus conferring jurisdiction over the parent. One,
the alter ego test, is pervasive among the circuits and requires a
showing that the parent and subsidiary are “not really separate
66
entities.” The more controversial test, and the one at issue in this
case, is the so-called agency test.

J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 420.
65. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
66. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting the proper inquiries
in a general jurisdiction case are to find the extent of a subsidiary’s contacts, whether imputation
to the parent is proper, and whether exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable). Petitioners in this
case urge the Supreme Court to adopt or at least “bless” the alter ego test as being both
constitutional and desirable. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 18.
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67

Only the Second and Ninth Circuits employ the agency test.
These courts attribute the subsidiary’s contacts to the parent when the
68
subsidiary acts as the parent’s “agent.” To be an agent for
jurisdictional purposes, the subsidiary’s services must be “sufficiently
importan[t]” to the parent corporation “that if it did not have a
representative to perform them, the [parent] corporation’s own
69
officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services.”
In addition to the “sufficient importance” prong, the Ninth Circuit
70
also requires “an element” of parental control over the subsidiary.
The “sufficient importance” standard for finding an agency
relationship is not found in agency law outside of the personal
71
jurisdiction context. This standard does not examine whether the
parent would perform the subsidiary’s activities itself if that particular
subsidiary disappeared, but rather asks whether the corporation
would perform the subsidiary’s activity itself if there was no agent
72
representative whatsoever to engage in that activity. Evidence that

67. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (allowing
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when its in-state representative entity performs
sufficiently important services on behalf of the foreign corporation that the corporation would
perform those services itself if no agent were available); Unocal, 248 F.3d at 928 (noting that to
satisfy the agency test, a party must demonstrate that “the subsidiary functions as the parent
corporation's representative in that it performs services that are sufficiently important to the
foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation's
own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services” (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
68. Unocal, 248 F.3d at 926 (“Nonetheless, if the parent and subsidiary are not really
separate entities, or one acts as an agent of the other, the local subsidiary's contacts with the
forum may be imputed to the foreign parent corporation.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
69. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 920 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Unocal,
248 F.3d at 928), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr.
22, 2013).
70. Id. The necessity of a showing of “control” in the Ninth Circuit’s agency test is
questionable. When Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler first went to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Nelson’s
now vacated opinion averred that the agency test required a finding of parental control “so
pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the
parent.” Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 644
F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995
(Apr. 22, 2013). This formulation, especially the “instrumentality” language, seems to conflate
the agency and alter ego tests. Judge Reinhardt’s dissent in the earlier opinion excoriated the
majority for making this benchmark showing so high and in the second DaimlerChrysler opinion
he pares down the required showing to “an element.” DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 920.
71. DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d. at 923.
72. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 95 (“[A N.Y. court] may assert jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation when it affiliates itself with a New York representative entity and that New York
representative renders services . . . sufficiently important to the foreign entity that the
corporation itself would perform equivalent services if no agent were available.”).
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the subsidiary’s activities are sufficiently important to the parent
corporation can include sales numbers by the subsidiary in the forum
73
74
state, or percentage of business conducted by that subsidiary.
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have explicitly rejected the
75
agency test for personal jurisdiction and use only the alter ego test.
The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits exclusively employ the alter ego
76
test, though they have not explicitly rejected the agency test. The
First and Eleventh Circuits employ a test for attributing contacts they
call an “agency test” in name, but which actually requires a showing
77
that the subsidiary and parent corporations are alter egos.
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether an agency
relationship allows a court to attribute a subsidiary’s contacts to the
parent for personal jurisdiction purposes. Indeed, although Supreme
Court dicta implies that an agency relationship may be important in a
78
specific jurisdiction inquiry, the Perkins threshold for general
jurisdiction still applies. Justice Ginsburg, although noting that a court
may have specific jurisdiction over a parent corporation based on a
subsidiary’s presence, nevertheless asserted: “[A]ll agree [a parent
corporation] surely is not subject to general (all-purpose) jurisdiction
in [forum state] courts, for that foreign-country corporation is hardly
79
‘at home’ [there].”
73. See DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 922 (noting that the auto company subsidiary’s
California sales comprised 2.4 percent of the parent’s worldwide sales).
74. See Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1406 (1994) (refusing to decide
whether a subsidiary was an agent when the record contained insufficient evidence of the
percentage of the parent’s business coming from the subsidiary).
75. See Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 596
(8th Cir. 2011) (finding imputation proper only with an alter ego showing); Cent. States, Se. &
Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 944 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the use of a subsidiary’s contacts for jurisdiction over a parent violates due
process).
76. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 433 (4th Cir.
2011); Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008);
Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990).
77. Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2000) (“For
Consolidated to persuade us that the district court had general personal jurisdiction over
Viridian because of VFI's activities in the United States, it would have to show that VFI's
corporate existence was simply a formality, and that it was merely Viridian's agent.”); Miller v.
Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d 769, 772 (1st Cir. 1985) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction when
subsidiary and parent were not, in reality, a single entity).
78. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 n.22 (1985) (“We have
previously noted that when commercial activities are carried on in behalf of an out-of-state
party those activities may sometimes be ascribed to the party . . . at least where he is a primary
participan[t] in the enterprise and has acted purposefully in directing those activities.” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2797–98 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,

NOELLE 12.5.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE BOUNDS OF GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION

12/5/2013 5:14 PM

29

In the only case on point, Cannon Manufacturing Co., the Court
refused to allow a North Carolina court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over an Alabama parent corporation when the parent
established a North Carolina subsidiary that it controlled
80
“immediately and completely.” Noting that both entities observed all
81
formal corporate distinctions and remained independent entities, the
Court phrased the question as “simply whether the corporate
separation carefully maintained must be ignored in determining the
82
existence of jurisdiction.” The Court held “the corporate separation
[between the two companies], though perhaps merely formal, was
real” and refused to consider the parent corporation properly subject
83
to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina.
Cannon Manufacturing Co. has not been overruled, although its
holding has not been incorporated into the Supreme Court’s modern,
contacts-based personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. However, by
employing the agency and alter ego tests, the lower federal courts
often ignore formal corporate separation in some general jurisdiction
inquiries. The Supreme Court’s decision in DaimlerChrysler will
determine whether this license is warranted.
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDING
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court order dismissing
84
the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Nelson, writing for
85
the majority, first rearticulated the Ninth Circuit agency test. He
averred that attribution of a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts to its
corporate parent required, in addition to a finding that the subsidiary
perform services of “sufficient importance” on behalf of the parent,
that the parent exercise “pervasive and continual control” over the
86
subsidiary. Such findings, when the subsidiary corporation’s contacts
dissenting).
80. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335 (1925).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 336.
83. Id. at 336–38.
84. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 644
F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995
(Apr. 22, 2013). The panel consisted of Judges Schroeder, Nelson, and Reinhardt. Id. at 1099.
After first affirming the district court with Judge Nelson writing for the majority and Reinhardt
in dissent, the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing without comment and the same panel issued a
second opinion, this time with Judge Reinhardt writing for the majority. Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 2011).
85. DaimlerChrysler, 579 F.3d at 1094–95.
86. Id. at 1095–96.
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make it “essentially at home” in the forum state, would render the
parent corporation similarly at home there. Objecting to this
heretofore unnecessary requirement of “pervasive and continual
control” in the agency test, Judge Reinhardt castigated the majority
for “formulat[ing] a stringent new test for determining whether an
agency relationship exists for the purposes of establishing personal
87
jurisdiction.”
Nine months later, the Ninth Circuit granted the Plaintiffs’
88
petition for rehearing. The very same panel then reversed the district
89
court and vacated the previous panel opinion. On rehearing, the new
Ninth Circuit panel asked “whether [Mercedes-Benz USA’s]
extensive contacts with California warrant[s] the exercise of general
90
jurisdiction over [DaimlerChrysler].” The panel, with Judge
Reinhardt now writing for the majority, determined that an agency
relationship existed. The court reasoned that because luxury car sales
in California accounted for 2.4 percent of DaimlerChrysler’s total
auto sales, and because nearly 50 percent of all DaimlerChrysler’s
revenue came from the sales activities of Mercedes-Benz USA,
Mercedes-Benz USA’s activities were of “sufficient importance” that,
in the absence of any representative to perform them,
91
DaimlerChrysler would perform them itself.
The panel then rejected Judge Nelson’s second prong to the
agency test—requiring a showing of “pervasive and continuous”
corporate control over the subsidiary—which would have rendered
the agency test much more akin to the alter ego test. Rather, the panel
averred that the only showing necessary to satisfy the agency test was
92
that the parent has the “right to control” the subsidiary. After
exhaustively reviewing DaimlerChrysler’s distributor agreement with
Mercedes-Benz USA, the court determined DaimlerChrysler had the
93
“right to substantially control” Mercedes-Benz USA’s activities.

87. Id. at 1098 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
88. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 603 F.3d 1141, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting
rehearing and vacating opinion).
89. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub
nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 931.
92. DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 923.
93. Id.
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DaimlerChrysler’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied.
Judge O’Scannlain, joined by eight other judges, wrote a blistering
dissent to the en banc denial criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s decision as
“extend[ing] the reach of general personal jurisdiction far beyond its
95
breaking point,” and calling its holding “an affront to due process.”
Specifically, the dissent attacked the panel’s use of a more lenient
agency test, with a relaxed “control” requirement, as “ignor[ing] the
bedrock concerns of fundamental fairness that underpin Supreme
96
Court due process jurisprudence.”
Judge O’Scannlain further castigated the panel for perpetuating
97
the circuit split and directly questioned the appropriateness of any
98
agency test for personal jurisdiction whatsoever. In his view, the
panel decision rejected “respect for corporate separateness”—a
99
fundamental feature of the economic and legal systems. Finally, the
dissent noted several foreign policy implications including the
possibility of retaliatory jurisdictional laws in Europe impeding
100
international agreements.
DaimlerChrysler petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the
101
Supreme Court.
V. ARGUMENTS
As a personal jurisdiction case, the overarching question before
the Supreme Court is whether California’s exercise of general
personal jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, this central question
can be distilled into a more basic inquiry—whether maintaining a
wholly-owned and independent subsidiary in the forum state can
render a foreign parent corporation “essentially at home” in that
state.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 774 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 774–75. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
Id. at 776–77.
Id.
Id. at 777–78.
Id.
Id. at 779.
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (granting certiorari).
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A. DaimlerChrysler’s Argument
DaimlerChrysler argues California’s exercise of general personal
jurisdiction over it, based solely on its relationship with a wholly
owned subsidiary in California, is contrary to the Court’s precedent
102
and a clear violation of the Due Process Clause.
Though
DaimlerChrysler’s brief asserts several other grounds for reversal, the
crux of its argument is a spirited attack on the constitutionality of the
103
Ninth Circuit’s agency test.
Using Perkins and Goodyear as a baseline, DaimlerChrysler
trenchantly argues that the contacts, activity, and presence of a
separate, subsidiary corporation in the forum state in no way renders
the parent corporation “at home” there. However, rather than argue
that attribution of a subsidiary corporation’s contacts is never
appropriate, DaimlerChrysler defends the prevalent alter ego test:
“Only a showing of an alter-ego relationship is adequate to meet
these constitutional requirements where an assertion of general
jurisdiction over a defendant is premised on the attribution of another
104
entity’s contacts with the forum.”
DaimlerChrysler’s argument in support of the alter ego test as the
only acceptable means of jurisdictional contact attribution is an
implied rejection of the agency test. It centers on the necessity of
preserving the venerable doctrine of corporate separation and
maintenance of the corporate veil as well as the due process principle
that jurisdictional rules provide notice and predictability to potential
105
defendants. Embracing the agency test would essentially destroy the
doctrine of corporate separateness—that “‘a corporation and its
stockholders are generally to be treated as separate entities,’
regardless of ‘the control which stock ownership gives to the
106
stockholders.’” This in turn would allow the Court to “pierce the
corporate veil”—holding stockholders, in this case the parent,
107
accountable for the actions of the corporation.
Maintaining
102. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 14.
103. Id. at 17. DaimlerChrysler argues initially that its direct contacts with California are
wholly insufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction there, though this is uncontested by either
party. Id. at 14. It also asserts that a California court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
DaimlerChrysler would be unreasonable when analyzed in terms of the factors enumerated in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, but this section focuses only on the agency argument. Id. at
37–38.
104. Id. at 18.
105. Id. at 27.
106. Id. (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1988)).
107. Id. at 19.
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corporate separateness, thereby protecting stockholders from liability,
is imperative because such corporate relationships constitute “the
only possible engine for carrying on international trade on a scale
108
commensurate with modern needs and opportunities.”
DaimlerChrysler points to Cannon Manufacturing Co. as being
part of a “long tradition” of honoring the formalities of corporate
109
separateness in the personal jurisdiction context.
In Canon
Manufacturing Co., the out-of-state parent was not subject to
jurisdiction in the forum state even though it completely dominated
110
the in-state subsidiary’s activities. Judicial deference to corporate
separateness is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s assertion that
personal jurisdiction inquiries demand the contacts of each party be
111
assessed individually.
Relying on this tradition, DaimlerChrysler argues, corporations
112
have become accustomed to working under the alter ego doctrine.
Upholding a test based on that doctrine would thus allow
corporations to better predict when their activities will expose them
to suit in a particular state, making corporate business decisions easier
113
and facilitating commerce. As a means for attributing contacts, the
alter ego test makes intuitive sense because when two corporations
114
are alter egos they are “not really separate entities.” Because an
alter ego finding means that the subsidiary is actually a “mere
115
instrumentality” of the parent, there is, de facto, no separation
between the subsidiary and parent. Due process cannot be offended
by the imputation of subsidiary contacts when those contacts are
actually those of the parent itself.
In contrast to the universality of the alter ego test,
DaimlerChrysler notes the “sufficient importance” showing for
agency, used only in the personal jurisdiction context and nowhere
116
117
else in agency law, is heavily disfavored among the federal circuits.
108. Id. at 18 (citing STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:1 (2012)).
109. Id. at 19.
110. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1925). See also supra notes
80–83 and accompanying text.
111. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 20 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S.
770, 781 n.13 (1984)).
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 23 (citing NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d
Cir. 2008)).
116. Id. at 25.
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And pointing to the “essentially at home” threshold in Goodyear,
DaimlerChrysler asserts that any jurisdictional agency test would
affront due process because no principal-agent relationship would
“ensure that defendants are subject to general jurisdiction only where
they—and not just their agents—have sufficient contacts to render
118
them ‘at home’ in the forum State.”
The policy reasons for abandoning the Ninth Circuit’s test include
its rejection of the “well-settled requirements for agency,” potentially
allowing states to catch defendants off-guard and subject them to suit
119
without any regard for that defendant’s actual contacts. Finally,
DaimlerChrysler echoes the concerns about foreign policy in Judge
O’Scannlain’s dissent, including concerns for the chilling effects on
international trade, and placing the United States’ jurisdictional
120
practices out of step with international standards.
B. Plaintiff-Respondents’ Argument
Plaintiffs present a novel and complex argument, essentially
asking the Court to fundamentally reexamine its general jurisdiction
jurisprudence. Specifically, Plaintiffs try to reframe the issue as an
examination of the very outer jurisdictional limits of what the Due
Process Clause will allow and whether California’s exercise of general
jurisdiction is beyond those limits.
Plaintiffs characterize any personal jurisdiction decision (specific
or general) as requiring three inquiries: (1) what contacts with the
forum are relevant; (2) are those contacts sufficient for the type of
jurisdiction asserted; and (3) if sufficient, has the defendant made a
compelling case that renders jurisdiction unreasonable under the Due
121
Process Clause. For Plaintiffs, this case concerns only whether the
California contacts and activities of DaimlerChrysler’s subsidiary,
122
Mercedes-Benz USA, are relevant to the jurisdiction inquiry.
Plaintiffs first argue that forums where a defendant is subject to
general jurisdiction are not expressly limited in number by the phrase
123
“at
home”
in
Goodyear.
Second,
Plaintiffs
dismiss
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 34.
120. Id. at 36.
121. Brief for Respondents at 12–13, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S.
Aug. 19, 2013), 2013 WL 4495139.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 15 (refuting DaimlerChrysler’s argument that the phrase “at home” refers
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DaimlerChrysler’s contention that the alter ego test is the only
acceptable means of attributing a subsidiary’s contacts to its parent.
Endorsing the alter ego test, they say, is inconsistent with federal
constitutional law because the rules outlining when two separate
corporations are really alter egos are almost entirely products of state
124
law. Rather than providing a desirable predictability in personal
jurisdiction rules that corporations can use to guide their business
decisions, endorsing the alter ego test could subject a corporation
doing business in the United States to fifty different standards.
125
Further, state long arm statutes, such as California’s, “extend[] . . .
personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the due process
126
clause.” This “fullest extent” of federal constitutional law cannot be
set by state-specific standards. Thus, the court should not limit
constitutional due process by subjecting it to the vagaries of fifty
127
different state veil-piercing provisions.
Plaintiffs invoke International Shoe, noting that in any exercise of
jurisdiction, the “ultimate question is whether . . . [the exercise]
comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
128
justice.’” The principal consideration is “the degree to which the
defendant ‘enjoys the benefits and protections of the laws of that
129
state’ by virtue of its ‘contacts’ with the forum.” A formalistic “alter
ego” test concentrates only on the relationship between parent and
subsidiary, not on whether the defendant enjoyed the benefits of the
130
forum state’s laws—even if through its agents. Rather, courts should
be allowed to consider the nature of jurisdictional contacts, including
their potential attribution or imputation to a corporate parent, in each
personal jurisdiction inquiry. A formality like corporate separateness
131
should not foreclose a court’s analysis of minimum contacts.

only to a limited number of jurisdictions such as incorporation or location of corporate
headquarters).
124. Id.
125. See supra note 29.
126. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 121, at 20.
127. Id. at 21–22.
128. Id. at 22 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
129. Id. at 22–23 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
130. Id. at 23.
131. Id. at 28.
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Plaintiffs distinguish Cannon Manufacturing Co., noting that the
Court there claimed no constitutional basis for its refusal to allow
personal jurisdiction, but rather cited a lack of statutory authority for
132
maintaining jurisdiction. The alter ego test is not enshrined in
federal constitutional law and Canon Manufacturing Co. was decided
well before International Shoe denounced the “strict formalism
underlying Cannon and similar decisions of its era, in favor of a more
133
pragmatic implementation of the Due Process Clause.” Finally, any
decision to endorse the alter ego test as a correct basis for attributing
jurisdictional contacts is correctly left to Congress—it is not a matter
of federal constitutional law.
Supporting the agency test, Plaintiffs claim that nothing in the
Due Process Clause prohibits a court from considering the contacts of
a defendant corporation’s subsidiary when that subsidiary undertakes
134
important duties and is controlled by the parent. Plaintiffs contend
that courts should be allowed to consider a subsidiary’s contacts in a
minimum-contacts analysis when “the subsidiary (1) is wholly owned
by the defendant; (2) undertakes an important part of the defendant’s
business in the forum; (3) exclusively for the defendant; and (4) does
135
so while subject to substantial control by its owner.”
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
A. The Attribution of Contacts
The most compelling question in this case is whether the Due
Process Clause allows the attribution of Mercedes-Benz USA’s
contacts to DaimlerChrysler. As noted above, the Supreme Court has
not authorized any method whatsoever whereby one organization’s
contacts with a forum can be attributed to another.
A tribunal with general jurisdiction has enormous power over a
defendant. That tribunal can hear any suit, arising out of any activity,
performed anywhere in the world. This enormous grant of power is
likely why the Supreme Court so steadfastly restricts the exercise of
general jurisdiction. In the modern business landscape, large
corporations and their interrelated networks of franchisees, agents,
and contractors are spread across multiple jurisdictions. This suggests
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 38.
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a corporation can be “essentially at home” in places other than its
formal “residences.” The current paradigm of general and specific
jurisdiction is neither wholly reflective of nor adequately tailored to
deal with the nuances of modern corporate relationships.
The circuit courts, by creating the agency and alter ego tests,
implicitly acknowledge that some form of jurisdictional contact
attribution is necessary to manage this corporate landscape. However,
the two attribution tests at issue here are not equal, and the Court will
almost assuredly reject the constitutionality of the agency test.
1. Evaluating the Agency Test
The Ninth Circuit agency test provides an extraordinarily liberal
metric for attributing a subsidiary corporation’s contacts to its parent.
The two-prong test asks first whether the parent corporation would
take on the activities of the subsidiary if no representative existed to
perform them. There is almost a presumption of agency in the parentsubsidiary context; otherwise why does the subsidiary exist? Further,
it requires hypothetical reasoning to determine what a corporation
would do in a completely imaginary situation. Judge Reinhardt’s
reasoning in the Ninth Circuit opinion is illustrative.
Judge Reinhardt found the 2.4 percent of total sales (through
Mercedes-Benz USA) in California as “sufficiently important to
[DaimlerChrysler] that they would almost certainly be performed by
136
other means.” He cited no evidence for this conclusion. He further
saw no difference in whether the subsidiary’s activity would likely be
performed by the company itself, another subsidiary, or a separate
137
representative. This prong of the agency test becomes such a grant
of judicial discretion as to be no test at all.
The additional prong, requiring a showing of “right of control”
rather than actual control, also provides little if any judicial guidance.
In this case, Judge Reinhardt, after listing all the instances in which
DaimlerChrysler had authority over Mercedes-Benz USA, concluded
138
DaimlerChrysler had a “right to substantially control” its subsidiary.
The nature of corporate subsidiaries, especially wholly-owned
corporate subsidiaries, will always allow some degree of control. Case
law has established no clear line at all for determining when
136. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 922 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added),
cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 924.

NOELLE 12.5.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

38

12/5/2013 5:14 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 9

customary contractual provisions go beyond establishing an ordinary
and unexceptional corporate relationship to creating a right to
control.
For Judge Reinhardt, the agency test allows courts to better hold
corporate entities to account for their misdeeds. Corporations are
able to benefit tremendously from American markets and evade
litigation through creative corporate structuring, “den[ying] the
plaintiffs, out of hand, a judicial forum and the opportunity to seek
139
redress of grievous wrongs.” The facts in this case underscore the
inapplicability of Judge Reinhardt’s justifications for the agency test.
In the first place, California would undoubtedly have specific
jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler if the harm in this case were
committed in California. The idea that DaimlerChrysler’s derivation
of even enormous benefit from business in California can render it
amenable to any suit whatsoever in that state goes far beyond the
bounds of any applicable precedent. Though it might be difficult to
think a multi-billion dollar corporation is terribly burdened compared
to the benefits it receives, the practical effect of the agency test would
be to subject a corporation to suit in an indeterminate number of
states, based on an arbitrary percentage of sales analysis, subject to a
haphazard exercise of judicial discretion.
Because of this essential arbitrariness, corporations would be
uncertain as to where they are subject to suit, faced with the
possibility of adjudicating any claim against them in any number of
fora. Whereas the doctrine of specific jurisdiction allows a corporation
to anticipate suits in places where it has contacts, general jurisdiction
would allow the worst form of forum shopping. Corporations may
decide to exercise less control over and grant more independence to
their subsidiaries to evade the agency test. This could result in less
efficient trade and business models.
Further, the ubiquity of corporate subsidiaries throughout the
world would turn melting-pot states like California into a forum for
all the world’s disputes. Perhaps a real palpable interest in seeing
human rights violations redressed would justify turning America into
such a forum. However, the judicial resources of the federal courts
would be severely taxed. Moreover, it would lessen domestic courts’

139. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011)), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG
v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013).
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ability to address issues of more tangible import to these fora. The
agency test, though perhaps a laudable attempt to redress corporate
wrongs, is an unwieldy tool at best.
2. Evaluating the Alter Ego test
The alter ego test, while not precisely at issue in this case, provides
a more workable, if also flawed, means of attribution. On its face, the
alter ego test makes more intuitive sense because an alter ego finding
140
is akin to finding the parent and subsidiary are the same entity. The
contacts of one are per se the contacts of the other—and if the
subsidiary is at home in a forum then the parent must also be
essentially at home in the forum. Thus, as a practical matter, it is less
likely to offend due process than the agency test.
The concept of the alter ego is generally known to corporate
entities and allows them more predictive ability to know where they
will be haled into court. However, as Plaintiffs note, the specific tests
141
for finding alter egos have their genesis in state corporate law. The
Supreme Court, should it embrace the alter ego test, would be in the
position either of effectively creating a wholly new and original
standard for alter egos that applies only in the personal jurisdiction
context, or admitting that what is allowed by the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause is ultimately a matter for individual
142
state law.
Although the alter ego test seems a workable answer to the
problem of attribution, the quandary facing the Court if it adopts the
alter ego test underscores the inadequacy of its prior jurisprudence.
Unquestionably some attribution mechanism is needed, but neither
test simultaneously accords with both its general and specific
jurisdiction precedents, or strikes an adequate balance between the
burdens on corporate clients and the interests of the several states.

140. See, e.g., Sys. Div., Inc. v. Teknek Electronics, Ltd., 253 Fed.Appx. 31, 37 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“The exercise of jurisdiction over an alter ego is compatible with due process because a
corporation and its alter ego are the same entity—thus, the jurisdictional contacts of one are the
jurisdictional contacts of the other for purposes of the International Shoe due process
analysis.”).
141. Brief for Respondents, supra note 121, at 20.
142. Id.
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B. The Court’s Likely Disposition
On the facts, this is an easy case for the Court. Unless the Court
decides to expand its general jurisdiction jurisprudence far beyond
143
where it currently stands, the Court will almost certainly reverse.
Goodyear was likewise an easy case in light of Perkins and
Helicopteros. Yet the Goodyear Court took that opportunity to
bolster the “continuous and systematic” language in Perkins with the
phrase “essentially at home” as the necessary predicate for the
exercise of general jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit decided this case
before Goodyear. And it would be an extraordinary step to say the
presence and activity of a wholly owned subsidiary providing 2.4
percent of total sales in California renders DaimlerChrysler
“essentially at home” there.
Moreover, the policy implications are also particularly persuasive,
in part because they are generally supported by the United States as
amicus curiae. Specifically, the United States’ statement of interest in
the case points to the need for jurisdictional consequences of
144
economic activity to be predictable, the deleterious effect such
expansive jurisdictional rules have had on international agreements
145
and reciprocal enforcement of judgments,
and the political
branches’ interest in seeing American international interests
146
protected.
Several members of the court have expressed particular concern
that foreign corporations could hide behind domestic distributors to
147
avoid liability for damages they cause. However, even those

143. There are two other plausible possibilities for disposition. First, the court could decide
that Mercedes-Benz USA’s contacts with California in no way render it “at home” there, thus
even the attribution of its contacts to DaimlerChrysler would be unavailing, requiring dismissal
as improvidently granted. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 55. Second, this case
arose under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA); the
Court recently determined that the ATS does not apply to activities overseas, and the TVPA
does not apply to organizations. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669
(2013) (“We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to
claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”); Mohamad v.
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012) (“The text of the TVPA convinces us that
Congress did not extend liability to organizations, sovereign or not.”). Thus, it is unclear
whether Plaintiffs have a cognizable claim and the Court may remand to determine this, or
dismiss.
144. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2,
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. July 5, 2013), 2013 WL 3377321.
145. Id. at 2–3.
146. Id.
147. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794–95 (2011).
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concerned members have explicitly acknowledged that, despite a
parent’s use of a domestic distributor, that parent was “hardly at
148
home” in the forum state.
Though the Plaintiffs present a creative argument for why the
agency test is theoretically allowed by the Due Process Clause, they
do not succeed in bringing it in line with the Supreme Court’s other
general jurisdiction cases. In asking the court to essentially go back to
the drawing board and ignore the specific showings required by
general personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs simply ask too much.
More curious is whether the Court will decide to adopt the alter
ego test, or wait for a day when an application of the test is more
directly before the court. In all probability, the question of whether
attributing the contacts of a subsidiary corporation to its parent on a
showing of alter egos offends due process will wait for another day.
VII. CONCLUSION
DaimlerChrysler represents a singular opportunity for the Court
to either solidify or completely reformulate a major jurisprudential
problem. In the end, the court is more likely to be persuaded by the
more staid, precedent-based argument of DaimlerChrysler and
reverse the Ninth Circuit to hold that exercise of general jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation cannot be predicated on an agency
relationship with an in-state subsidiary. Plaintiffs, however, present a
nuanced argument that exposes some important inconsistencies in
current doctrine and suggests that the outer limits of what due
process allows in personal jurisdiction are far wider than heretofore
tested. Though creative, this argument is likely unpersuasive to a
Court that has been steadfastly united in its recent general
149
jurisdiction decisions. Despite this steadfastness, DaimlerChrysler
shows how even a seemingly settled area of personal jurisdiction
doctrine is rife with inconsistency and contradiction, and in desperate
need of Supreme Court guidance. Though it may not in this case, the
Court should seek an opportunity to redefine jurisdiction to match
the modern business landscape.

148. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011)
(rejecting the exercise of general jurisdiction in a unanimous opinion).

